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The main contributions of the paper can be divided into five areas. (a) It tries to explain conceptually, the
institutional arrangements for water supply in Chennai and whether the state government’s decision about
improving the performance of the water utility depends on particular political circumstances. A plausible
explanation is also given of the impact of ground water regulation on the supply decision of private sector
(tanker truck operators), using a crowding out framework. (b) It discusses how Amartya Sen’s
entitlements approach could be used to understand water scarcity as a problem of some people not having
enough water rather than a problem of there being not enough water, and in that light, to examine
inequality in access to water supply. (c) The paper presents a water balance sheet for Chennai. While I do
not use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, I suggest a possible framework to use such
models for water supply policy issues at city level. (d) Aspects of water quality are discussed by focusing
on the steps taken by households to improve water quality at home, and whether access to energy also
contributes to entitlement deprivation of the poor. (e) Monthly household expenditure on water supply is
briefly examined. These expenditures comprise direct costs, the cost of time spent in collecting water, and
expenditure incurred in improving the quality. Expenditure on water is found to be positively associated
with years of education of the respondent, water endowment, home ownership and location within
Chennai City (as compared to residing in the peri-urban areas). The low income households do spend a
slightly larger proportion of their monthly income on water supply as compared to others, mainly in the
form of the cost of time spent in collecting water. Due to energy prices and lack of access to certain
sources of energy, they may also be suffering from entitlement deprivation in having to settle for using
water of low quality and increased health risk.
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1 Introduction
Water scarcity can be defined in a number of ways and how one defines it has
implications for policy. In one approach, water scarcity has been interpreted as a
problem of there being not enough water in aggregate terms (as in the case of arid
regions, such as the Middle East) or in per capita terms (as in the case of countries with
annual renewable fresh water sources, measured in cubic metres per capita, CMPC,
below a certain level)1. Water scarcity in this approach is a result of providence (in
terms of water as a natural resource) and population. A national metric tells us little
about distribution within a nation.2 More importantly, describing water scarcity as a
problem imposed by environmental constraints or population can lead to an alarmist or
doomsday rhetoric.3 An extension of this view-point is the hypothesis that water
scarcity is a potential source of violent conflict between nations.4 While they may be
well-intentioned, they may be criticised for making a patronizing assumption (that some
nations and societies are morally so backward as to be prepared to wage a war to
acquire a commodity). The main problem in such arguments is that a conflict over rights
(to resources) is incorrectly interpreted as a conflict over resources themselves.5 On the
whole, while the intention of the providence approach may be to highlight the urgency
to act, it may have quite the opposite effect. It may turn policy makers into fatalists,a si t
presents water scarcity as a problem of nature and population, both beyond the control
of policy, specially in the short run.
Another approach to water scarcity sees it as a symptom of poverty. Not having
adequate water or sanitation is thus, seen as a characteristic of less developed
countries.6 Thus, the policy conclusion seems to be that economic development will (in
due course) lead to improvements in water supply and hence, there is no need to worry
about specific symptoms of poverty. Thus, this approach may turn policy makers into
patient optimists.
1 For example, areas where water availability is less than 1, 700 cubic metres per capita (CMPC), are
defined as experiencing ‘water stress’. See WRI (2000: 107).
2 As of 1991, India’s total potential of renewable freshwater is estimated to be 2, 200 CMPC. However,
per capita availability varies considerably from 16, 000 CMPC in Brahmaputra basin to as low as 360
CMPC in Sabarmati basin (Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India at URL:
<http://www.wrmin.nic.in>). Also see Nussbaum and Sen (1993), for various criticisms on national or
per capita measures.
3 As examples of doomsday view, I would include Postel (1995) and Falkenmark (1997) and some
arguments in Gleick (2000). Others such as Shiklomanov (1997), and Kuylenstierna et al. (1997),
acknowledge the limitations of such assessments based on national or regional indicators. Rock (1998)
and Anand (1999a), explore whether there is any Kuznets-type relationship between GNP per capita
and the amount of fresh water available per capita.
4 See for example, Homer-Dixon (1998), and Swain (2000).
5 This is more than a subtle difference. What are referred to as wars over resources (whether water or
oil or diamonds or territory) are often wars over contested rights or contested claims seeking to
modify the existing distribution of rights or conflicts triggered by usurpation of one party’s rights by
another.
6 The World Bank (1992: 11) and Shafik (1994), report negative relationships between per capita GDP
and percentage of population not having access to water supply and sewerage.2
A third approach to water scarcity also sees it as a problem of poverty, but as something
that needs to be addressed quickly and not something that can be left to the trickle down
effect of economic development. Thus, scarcity is interpreted as a problem of there
being enough water but not enough money or technology or human resources to bring
that water to the people. Much international financing of water resources and water
supply projects during the period 1950 to 1990, reflects this thinking. This approach
may turn policy makers into enthusiastic engineers.
A fourth approach is to consider access to water supply as an important ingredient of
quality of life and water scarcity as a capability deprivation. Attention to poverty is
shifting from income based measures of poverty to inequality and capability deprivation
(Sen 1999). That by itself does not mean one has to study each ingredient of quality of
life. However, there is scope to examine whether water scarcity can be redefined as a
problem of some people not having enough water and what societies can do about this.
This requires the examination of whether some people suffer from systematic and
appalling deprivation and what needs to be done. For example, an argument is that some
people (the poor) may be more vulnerable to health impacts of water supply problems.
Hence, improving access to water and sanitation has been considered to be an important
target by itself and also an important aspect of the international development target of
reducing by one-half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015. While
the capability approach is recognized by international donors7 and research community,
8 as of now, there is little evidence of its use by water supply policy makers (and hence,
no short name).
Against this background, this paper focuses on understanding water ‘scarcity’ at the
level of an individual city and it tries to examine the institutional and individual
responses to water supply shortages and scarcity in Chennai (Madras), India. The plan
of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly considers some strands of the relevant
literature on understanding water supply issues. Section 3 discusses water supply
provision in Chennai. Included in this section are an explanation of how ground water
regulation affects market response and a discussion on a water balance sheet for
Chennai. Section 4 focuses on issues of inequality in access to water supply using
entitlements approach. Section 5 focuses on the various steps that households in
Chennai take to improve water quality. Section 6 examines monthly expenditures
incurred by households in relation to direct costs, costs of time in collecting water and
costs related to improving water quality. Some issues for policy and further research are
summarized in section 7.
7 See for example, the World Bank (2000), though Skirbekk and St. Clair (2000) feel that ‘… it is
highly questionable that the WDR could be consistent with Sen’s approach’ because of WDR’s
emphasis on measurement.
8 See various papers presented at the conference ‘Justice and Poverty: Examining Sen’s Capability
Approach’, University of Cambridge, St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge, June 2001. See URL at
<http://www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/~vhi/sen/index.shtml>3
2 Institutions and entitlements in relation to water supply?
If scarcity of water in Chennai is considered as a problem of there being not enough
water, responses could be to look for distant sources or ingenious schemes (including
desalination and cloud seeding). If on the other hand, scarcity of water is considered to
be a problem of some people not having enough water, the kind of questions that need
to be asked will be different. In this regard, I will consider three strands of literature
(while acknowledging there may well be other strands, equally important): institutional
arrangement for water supply, the second one using cost benefit analysis, and the third
one relating to entitlements issues.
2.1 Institutions for delivering water supply
Various studies of institutions focused on the question why villagers in certain
developing countries engage in collective action and develop institutions to allocate and
manage irrigation waters and whether such institutions can be created and sustained
elsewhere (Wade 1988; Ostrom 1990, 1993; Bardhan 1995, 2000; Uphoff 1996).
Hirschman’s exit and voice framework has been used to understand how citizens are
likely to react in relation to the degree of market failure and a lack of accountability in
the provision of various public services in cities (Paul 1992; 1994). I have argued
elsewhere that urban residents are more likely to engage in collective action in case of
public goods and take recourse to exit in case of goods where private property rights are
recognized (Anand 2000). Since water supply is a private good, I feel that the property
rights issues are more important than collective action and incentives. Another strand of
studies relating to institutions focused mainly on privatization of infrastructure and
whether the British, French or other models of privatized water utilities can be applied
in the context of developing countries (World Bank 1994; Government of India 1996;
Brockman and Williams 1996; ECLAC 1998; Hardoy and Schusterman 2000). Though
water supply is a private good, in many countries it has been publicly provided, mainly
because of two reasons: (i) water supply infrastructure is capital intensive with natural
monopolies; and (ii) that the needs of the poor can be best protected by keeping water
supply in the public sector. In recent years, both these arguments have been questioned.
The need to evolve institutions to strike a balance between insulating infrastructure
provision from political control and capture on the one hand and the need to maintain
accountability on the other has been widely recognized. Depending on how much faith
one has in state and market institutions, the various generic arrangements for water
supply can be shown in Figure 1.
While it has been common in many countries to have water supply as a purely public
sector provision (model C), in some Latin American countries and some South East
Asian countries, there have been attempts to change it to model A through privatization.
For many countries that have not yet privatized water utilities, model B is likely to be
relevant.9
9 There is no ‘pure vanilla’ of model B and what is suggested above can lend itself to various alternative
forms depending on how close to the state or market the arrangement is. For example: (a)
Arrangement BA – creating contestable market rather than a privatized monopoly or by establishing
property rights to water and allowing a Coasean bargain to take place (with provisions for ensuring
some life-line level of supply). Instead of one company supplying water, there could be various4
Figure 1
Alternative approaches to reforming water and sanitation provision
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2.2 Cost benefit analysis strand
Studies in this strand, mainly focused on extending conventional project analysis to
water supply projects.10 Given that many governments provided water supply at
nominal charges or for free, estimating the benefits of water supply projects requires
some information on consumer willingness to pay. Some studies used the contingent
valuation method and argued that consumers in rural areas are willing to pay for
obtaining connections (World Bank Water Demand Research Team 1993; Singh et al.
1993; Griffin et al. 1995; Altaf et al. 1993). In the process of exploring economic
aspects of water supply, some of these studies also examined water vending activities in
developing countries (for example, in Whittington et al. 1991; Cairncross and Kinnear
1992; Fass 1993) and whether there is considerable mark up in prices and whether this
can be explained as rent-seeking behaviour by some agents have also been explored
(Lovei and Whittington 1993; Crane 1994). While at a theoretical level, cost benefit
analysis text-books began to include chapters on water supply issues (as for example,
Whittington et al. 1994), in practice, the trend seems to have been quite the opposite. In
some cases, the presence of water vending is seen as sufficient indicator of demand for
companies competing to supply water; (b) Arrangement CB – with water board remaining a state
entity but some aspects of it being contracted out; (c) Arrangement BB – with water board remaining
a state entity but with considerable autonomy and be subjected to scrutiny by an independent
ombudsman, and so on.
10 See ADB (1999) and also Swarna and Whittington (1994). Also see WELL and DFID (1998).5
water supply requiring no further economic analysis to justify increased investments
(World Bank 1995: 23).
2.3 An entitlements approach to household water supply
While the above two strands covered a range of issues, property rights issues seem to
have been completely ignored in urban water supply.11 One way to focus on property
rights and institutions concerning water supply is to use Sen’s entitlements concept (Sen
1981; Sen 1990). Sen’s argument concerns food grains and the ‘fixation’ with per capita
food availability decline (or FAD). Sen argued that famine and starvation is a matter of
‘… some people not having enough food to eat, and not a matter of there being not
enough food to eat’. Further, according to Sen (1984: 454):
“In a fully directed economy, each person i may simply get a particular
commodity bundle that is assigned to him … Typically, however, there is
a menu – possibly wide – to choose from. Ei is the entitlement set of
person i in a given society, in a given situation, and it consists of a set of
vectors of alternative commodity bundles, any one of which the person
can decide to have. In an economy with private ownership and exchange
in the form of trade (exchange with others) and production (exchange
with nature), Ei can be characterised as depending on two parameters: the
endowment vector x and an exchange entitlement mapping Ei (·)w h i c h
specifies the set of commodity bundles any one of which person i can
choose to have through ‘exchange’ (trade and production).”
Sen points out that the expression entitlement here is used to connote ‘… the legal,
political, economic and social characteristics of the society in question’ and the
individual’s position in it. Entitlements approach helps us to see famine and starvation
as an acquirement problem in relation to specific institutions and as ‘economic disasters,
not just as food crises’. Sen argues that a policy response such as rushing more food to
famine-stricken areas may not alleviate starvation, when the main cause of famine is
one of entitlement failure.
Thus, individuals have various endowments (either in the form of things they have
acquired, such as land, or a capacity that enables them to acquire, such as labour or
knowledge and certain rights). These endowments combined with institutional
arrangements determine the individual’s entitlements which in turn determine the
various functionings which can be achieved. The ‘totality of all the alternative
functioning vectors a person can choose from … reflects the person’s capabilities’ (Sen,
1985: 27). These functionings reflect well-being because ‘… how well a person is must
be a matter of what kind of life he or she is living, and what the person is succeeding in
“doing” or “being”’ (Sen 1985: 28). A number of alternative explanations of
entitlements and criticisms exist (see Sen 1990; Gore 1993; Gasper 2001). Gasper
(1993) points out that the expression entitlements can have different meanings such as:
‘… present rights to resources, or rightfully held resources, or a set of possible titles
arising from the use of rights and resources’. Leach et al. (1999) discuss environmental
11 There has been some discussion on property rights in relation to ground water (for example, Moench
1998), but much focus in this literature seems to be on irrigation (for example, Shah 1993).6
entitlements as the ‘… alternative sets of utilities derived from environmental goods and
services over which social actors have legitimate effective command and which are
instrumental in achieving well-being’. They, however, feel that instead of focusing on
particular endowments, entitlements and capabilities which ‘… represent only a
snapshot in time’, it is important to focus on the relationships among various forms of
institutions operating at a range of scales (p. 234).
There are various reasons why an entitlements approach may be useful for
understanding access to water supply:
i) Water ‘scarcity’ is often perceived as a situation when per capita water
availability declines below what is considered to be acceptable norm.
ii) Similar to food, water supply is also a private good whose acquirement is
subject to social and political institutions, cultural norms and property rights.
In some contexts, societies may include provisions for non-entitlement
transfers of water (such as through public fountains). However, this is to
supplement access to water through other institutions rather than to substitute
it. When non-entitlement transfer is the only form of access to water,
inequality can be expected to be pervasive.
iii) Water scarcity can have important consequences for well being. For instance,
when water shortages are serious, educational institutions in cities such as
Chennai have been closed down temporarily. Scarcity of water supply may in
turn restrict the functionings of households in several ways. For example,
though households take all due care with regard to securing and storing
drinking water, acute shortage may force households to economize water by
lowering standards of hygiene in flushing the toilets or in washing up which
may lead to bacteriological contamination causing diarrheal or other diseases.
When water supply is rationed and there is no certainty as to the hours or times
when water will be supplied, a member of the household is forced to stay at or
close to home, lest they miss out when water is delivered.
iv) Some groups in the population may suffer from lack of water even when there
is no decline in water availability in the region.
v) An acute water scarcity can co-exist with a transfer of water to non-human
consumption uses, such as agriculture or industry or simply for other luxury
uses (see Bhatia 1992). This is equivalent to the counter-movement of food
away from famine regions that Sen talks about.
vi) Policy responses to water scarcity often focus on pumping or moving more
water to a region suffering from water scarcity. These are akin to the so called
‘direct delivery’ method of supplying food in case of famine relief (Dreze and
Sen 1989: 85).
Given that water is a bulky commodity and given the limitations for households to
engage in day-to-day retail trade in water, it is the endowment portion rather than7
exchange entitlements component which determines the amount of water that a person
gets in a system. One can construct a water endowment12 of person i as follows:
Ei = S mij *Q j (1)
j
where
mij is 1 if household i has access to source j and 0 otherwise
Qj is the average quantum of water available from source j
If we feel that some sources are of poor quality (say, unprotected) then a distinction can
be made. If we assume, all sources to be substitutable to each other, then we have the
additive formulation as above. Similarly, if salinity affects some of the sources, it is
possible to adjust the endowment calculation accordingly. Another important element
concerning water quality affects entitlements through the relationship between access to
energy, energy prices and the marginal rate of substitution between energy and water.13
In a two-dimensional case, households have a budget constraint (consisting of income
and time, which can also be converted into income) and have two goods to choose,
water on one axis and a composite good (of all other commodities, including leisure) on
the other axis. Due to inequality in access to energy or the differential impact of energy
prices on different households (for example, some may have access to subsidy), the
poor may face a rate of transformation between the two goods which is steeper than the
budget line. As a result of this entitlement deprivation, the poor settle for poor quality
water and thus, be more vulnerable to health impacts and so on.
In this background, I will examine water supply provision in Chennai and will attempt
to use the entitlements approach to discuss inequality in access. As in any field, the
price of specialization (in the form of evolution of literature into various strands) is a
partial vision. What institutions can or cannot do may depend on what individuals need
and what they themselves can or cannot do and this may in turn depend on the property
rights and issues of access.
3 Water supply provision in Chennai
According to the WHO-UNICEF (2000) assessment, world wide, 94 per cent of urban
population compared to 71 per cent of rural population is ‘covered’ by water supply.
12 It is also possible to distinguish between private property rights and communal property rights. Such
distinction may be necessary because: private property rights (having a well or borewell within the
premises) may offer additional convenience and may require less time and labour in collecting water
(though there could be exceptions). Then, one can decompose the right hand side in equation 1 into
public (1 to j) and private (1 to k) components.
Ei = S mij *Q
Pub




13 Thanks to Tony Addison for pointing out this possibility to me.8
The Government of India (2000: 208) estimated that 90.2 per cent of India’s urban
population is covered by water supply. As per the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply
and Sewerage Board (hereafter referred to as CMWSSB, or the Metro Water Board), 92
per cent of households in Chennai are covered by water supply (CMDA 1995: 92). The
above figures seem to suggest that as far as the urban areas are concerned, the global
development target has already been achieved or is easily achievable. Yet, even a casual
visitor to cities such as Chennai will notice quite a lot of activity going on in relation to
securing water, both by firms as well as by individuals – an observation that appears to
be incompatible with the statistic suggested above.14
This study uses the data-set from a primary household survey in Chennai (Anand 1996).
Reference is also made to various documents and interviews with local policy makers
and researchers in Chennai at different points in time during the period 1996-2000.
Details of the household survey are provided in Appendix 1.
3.1 Institutional arrangements in Chennai
Depending on where one lives within Chennai metropolitan area, four distinct systems
of water supply can be found in Chennai:
i) Supply of water by the Metro Water Board – mainly for Chennai City;
ii) Municipal supply – in 9 towns adjoining Chennai;
iii) Self-provision by many households and industries – by drilling of shallow
wells or deep tubewells;
iv) Private market – (a) bulk supply by means of tanker trucks of 12, 000 litres
capacity and (b) retail distribution of 'bottled water' in jerry cans of 10 or 12
litres capacity.
In relation to the generic models discussed in Figure 1 earlier, water supply in Chennai
was originally of model C (when water supply was one of the services provided by
Chennai Corporation). In 1978, the water supply and sanitation functions were moved
from Chennai Corporation to a state government board, namely the Metro Water Board
(see Figure 2). Thus, the arrangement shifted slightly towards model CB. However, this
seems to have created problems of accountability.
Voters in the entire state elect 234 members to the state legislature. Of these, 14 are
elected from constituencies contained within Chennai City and another 6 from
constituencies contained in the rest of Chennai metropolitan area. The party having a
simple majority in the state legislature forms the state government. Thus, as a creature
of the state government, the Metro Water Board is accountable (through the state
legislature) to the entire population of Tamil Nadu state (approximately 50 million)
rather than to the people of Chennai (6 million) though it supplies water only to people
of Chennai City and a few adjoining areas (and not even the whole of Chennai
metropolitan area).
14 About 30 years ago, Ashokamitran’s (1994) Tamil novel was centred around individuals in Madras
trying to secure water. Various newspaper reports in recent times also give an indication of water
scarcity and shortages. See the archives of The Hindu at the URL:
<http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/>9
Figure 2
A conceptual view of Metro Water Board in relation to its customers










To make Metro Water Board more directly accountable to its customers, it can be
moved back to model C (proponents of democratic decentralization) or towards model
BB (where it is made more autonomous but also subject to independent scrutiny) or it
can be privatized (model A). Each arrangement has its own pros and cons.15
During 1998, the Metro Water Board issued a citizen’s charter (CMWSSB 1998) with
the apparent intention of making it more responsive to its consumers (a step in the
direction of model BB in relation to Figure 1). Also, during 1998-2000, a committee
was set up jointly between the Metro Water Board and the Corporation of Chennai to be
chaired by the Mayor (a step in the direction of model C in Figure 1). However, these
remained ad hoc measures issued by executive fiat rather than formal arrangements
made by amending the existing laws. If the intention is to make the Metro Water Board
more responsive and accessible to its consumers, why not amend the law rather than use
executive provisions?
Public policy is not made by an autonomous and altruistic agents. A plausible
explanation for the short term reforms is that by keeping an important local service
(water supply and sewerage) under its control, the state government can influence how
15 A reading of the Tamil Nadu State Water Policy issued in 1994 (G.O. Ms. No. 716 PW (WR)
Department dt 13-07-94) indicates: (a) an excessive and exclusive focus on engineering aspects and a
blue-print attitude; and (b) an emphasis on ‘integrated’ management of water resources which is
presented as a justification for centralization of decision making to the extent to conceive of several
layers of committees with a grand committee of 36 members (including several members of the rank
of Secretary to the government) at the top to be chaired by the Chief Minister which is supposed to
make decisions in relation to all aspects of water resources management, formulate policy and decide
on projects. This large committee is supposed to meet periodically, at least once every three months.
In this climate, the prospects for moving to model C appear rather limited.10
citizens perceive the performance of local government and hence, the prospects of its
candidates being elected. Let us imagine two political parties A and B, of which A is in
power in the state government (and hence, controls the Metro Water Board). Its decision
whether Metro Water Board should improve its performance or not depends on who is
incumbent at the local government and what its own prospects of getting elected to the
local government are. The possibilities faced by the state government are shown in
Table 1 below.
If the probability of party A winning the local elections is either very high or very low,
it seems that the performance of a local level service does not matter. A strategy about
performance of services may be crucial only when elections are competitive and hence,
the chances of winning are perceived to be low or marginal. In that case, the state
government’s strategy seems to depend on which party is incumbent at the local
government. If A is incumbent at the local government and it faces a stiff challenge,
then the state government has incentives to use its power to improve the performance of
the Metro Water Board. If the local government is presently controlled by the opponent
(B), then the state government may have incentives to actually make the Metro Water
Board worsen its performance. In all other cases, the state government has no incentives
to improve the performance of the Metro Water Board.
The above is just one explanation of how the state government may use the performance
of the Metro Water Board to influence the politics concerning the local government. In
a different context, for example, when there is a liquidity problem with regard to state
government finances, good performance by the Metro Water Board may be helpful to
raise resources for new projects (which are then diverted to meet with the short term
liquidity problem). In this climate, irrespective of which political party is in power, the
state government has incentives to remain myopic and keep reforms of organizations
such as the Metro Water Board in an ad hoc and temporary manner rather than enshrine
them in the law.
Table 1
Should the Metro Water Board co-operate with the local government and improve its own
performance (when the state government is of party A)?
The chances of A being successful at local government elections
Incumbent in the
local government is: Very low Low or marginal High
A Don’t bother Co-operate Don’t bother
B Don’t bother Don’t co-operate Don’t bother
3.2 Households as per the main source of water supply: census 1991
While the models above concern piped water supply, it forms just one of the various
sources from which Chennai households get water. As per the 1991 Census, Chennai
urban area had about 1.01 million households. Distribution of these households
according to the main source of water is given in Table 2 below.11
From the above table, we can see that about 35 per cent of all households in Chennai
depended on a well as their main source of water. Another 22 per cent of the households
depended on a tubewell or a handpump, which draws water from deep ground water
aquifers. Within Chennai City, only 44 per cent of all households drew water from a
tap.16 The share of people drawing water from a tap in the urban agglomeration area
(outside the City) is even lower. Information from Census thus, seems to suggest that
the coverage figures mentioned in the official documents may be inflated or that the
definition of coverage may be problematic.
Table 2
Number of households in Chennai Urban Agglomeration (CUA)
as per main source of water: 1991














Well 125,775 153,005 40,760 55,650 166,535 208,655 375,190
Tap 205,765 26,925 129,360 44,525 335,125 71,450 406,575
Handpump/
Tubewell
126,040 19,300 79,925 15,480 205,965 34,780 240,745
River/Canal 180 65 90 105 270 170 440
Tank 105 60 50 880 155 940 1,095
Others 8,195 340 44,390 3,780 52,585 4,120 56,705
All Sources 466,060 199,695 294,575 120,420 760,635 320,115 1,080,750
Source: Data from the Census of India, 1991.
3.3 A portfolio of water sources: 1996 survey
The Census figures above indicate that households in metropolitan cities such as
Chennai often depend on more than one source of water. They may be doing this
because of risks from various sources, the property rights and other factors governing
access to such sources, the water needs of the household, opportunity cost of labour
(determined by the number of members in the household and labour market
participation rates), quantity and quality of water from different sources and so on.
Table 3 presents information from the Chennai household survey on the distribution of
households having access to various sources of water.
16 This is (335, 125/760635). More than a third of these households (i.e., 129, 360 out of 335, 125), in
fact, depend on a tap which is outside the premises.12
Table 3
Households in Chennai as per various sources of water: 1996
Chennai City 9 Towns Total for CMA
A No source within the premises 19.3% 16.1% 17.6%
B Shallow well 16.5% 54.8% 29.1%
C Tubewell 6.4% -- 4.7%
D Shared Municipal Tap Connection 8.3% -- 6.1%
E Municipal Tap Connection 4.6% 6.5% 4.7%
F Well and Connection 15.6% 16.1% 14.9%
G Tubewell and Connection 27.5% 3.2% 20.9%
H Well, Tubewell and Connection 1.8% 3.2% 2.0%
I Sub-total for households with
connection categories (D+E+F+G+H)
57.8% 29.0% 48.6%
Total for all categories 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s calculation from the household survey, 1996.
It can be seen that about 42 per cent of households in Chennai City and more than 70
per cent of households in the rest of CMA are not covered by the piped water supply
system. These figures are in line with Census results mentioned above. About 37.8 per
cent of households in the metropolitan area and 44.9 per cent of households in Chennai
City depend on more than one source of water. Among the households living with
Chennai City, the largest category is that of households having a tap and a tubewell
(27.5 per cent).
3.4 Estimating the allocation of water to different users
A simple definition of water supply is the transfer of water from certain sources to
certain end users. To make water supply effective, the water planner needs to take into
account all three aspects, namely, source development, the process of transmission, the
demands of different end users. Decisions concerning one can impinge on the
effectiveness of interventions concerning the other aspects. In Chennai, over the last
three decades, a lot of attention focused mainly on increasing the sources of water, the
other two dimensions have concerned relatively less attention.17 A balance sheet may
be a useful tool to get a glimpse of all three aspects of water supply. I have attempted to
collate various sources of information including the household survey conducted by me
in 1996, data from the Census of India, data from the Central Groundwater Board, the
17 Much attention focused on bringing water to Chennai from distant sources. In 1983, an agreement was
signed with the neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh to draw 12 TMCft of water from river Krishna
(Government of Tamil Nadu 1983). In September 1996, the first phase of this project was inaugurated
and about 3 TMCft or roughly 200 million litres per day (MLD) has been added to raw water supply
for Chennai. See Ramakrishnan (1996), for some details. Also see various reports in The Hindu on
efforts to bring water from Neyveli, Erode, Mettur and Tirunelveli (13 July 2001); Palar (26 July
2001); Veeranam (19 August 2001); and setting up of two desalination plants in Chennai (25 July
2001).13
Institute for Water Studies, the Metro Water Board (CMWSSB 1995), and so on, the
details of which are discussed elsewhere (Anand 2001). The resulting water balance
sheet is shown below in Figure 3.
According to the water balance sheet, in an average year, before the Krishna water
project, Chennai consumed above 600.1 million litres of water per day (MLD) or
roughly 111 lpcd. With regard to sources, we see that, 226 MLD (or 37.6 per cent of
600.1 MLD) came from surface sources and the remainder came from ground water
sources. Of this, the Metro Water Board’s supply was about 380 MLD. As per the
Metro Water Board, in 1996, water supply was about 290 MLD and with the water
received from Krishna project, this was increased to 480 MLD (CMWSSB 2000).
However, ‘due to poor rainfall and lesser receipt of water from the Krishna source’, the
total quantum of water supplied by the Board once again declined to about 250 MLD in
1999 and 2000. Though the water balance sheet developed here relates to the position
before 1996, the overall picture in terms of relative shares, specially the user side of it,
is unlikely to have changed significantly.
With regard to end-uses, (a) 71 MLD of water was supplied to metered connections (to
non-residential users); (b) 302 MLD of water was supplied to unmetered connections of
which 101 MLD was supplied to residential use (including 4 MLD for public
fountains); (c) 10 MLD of water was supplied to static tanks by tanker trucks of Metro
Water Board. This is summarized in Table 4.
In Table 4, the expression private sources includes supplies from the so called water
vendors and also self-provision by households (from wells and tubewells). According to
the information provided by the Metro Water Board, the survey of 50 water utilities
(McIntosh and Yniguez 1997) lists Chennai amongst cities with ‘no significant water
vending’. However, this is contestable. Water vending in Chennai can be seen in terms
of three categories.18 The first category is that of wholesale operators who supply water
by tanker trucks of 12, 000 litres. As shown in the balance sheet, supply from this
source was about 8 MLD. The second category is that of ‘bottled’ water, supplied
mainly in 12 litre jerry cans. A number of private firms are engaged in this activity.
Supply from this route works out to about 0.1 MLD. The third category is that of retail
water vendors who supply drinking water to households not having water connections.
These mainly draw water from the ‘static tanks’. These were about 3, 700 in 1996,
scattered through out Chennai. Each tank has a capacity of about 3, 000 litres. These are
filled everyday by tanker trucks of Metro Water Board. Vendors then draw water from
these tanks and supply it to their customers. A majority of them have improvised a
bicycle to transport water, while a small number of them have been using specially built
push-carts or tricycle carts with a large drum. As seen from the water balance sheet,
about 10 MLD was supplied through static tanks. About a third to one half of this is
taken by water vendors while the rest is taken by households in the vicinity of the static
tanks. Thus, the extent of water vending can be placed at about 11.4 to 13.1 MLD (or
about 2 per cent of 600.1 MLD). In recent years, Metro Water Board has increased the
number of such tanks to about 5, 500 and that these are filled every day by making 3,
800 trips by tanker trucks contracted by Metro Water Board, to distribute about 35
MLD (CMWSSB 2000). Increasing the number of static tanks appears to be a policy
response to keep prices in this segment low.
18 For details on water vending in Chennai, see Anand (1999b) and Anand (2001).14
Figure 3












































50 ........... (Metro Water) Residential 50

















Others 1 Residential 1
Entire
CUA








Total 226 374.1 600.1
Source: Anand (2001).15
Table 4
End uses of water in million litres per day (MLD)
By public sector Private sources Total
Residential19 193 131.1 324.1
Industrial 47 ? 47
Commercial 9 4 13
All other uses 101 ? 101
Unaccounted for water 115 ? 115
Total20 465 135.1 600.1
Note: Question marks indicate that we have no data on these items.
3.5 Explaining the interaction between regulation of ground water and market
response
From the balance sheet, we see that the Metro Water Board depends on ground water
for nearly a half of all water it supplies. In 1987, the state government enacted the
Chennai Metropolitan Area Groundwater (Regulation) Act, 1987, giving additional
regulatory powers to the Metro Water Board.21 Under this legislation, certain areas
around Chennai are listed in the schedule and in those areas, everyone who sinks a well
or drills a tubewell needs to obtain a license. Similarly, anyone transporting water by
tanker trucks also needs to obtain a license.
Apart from having one’s own well, the two main suppliers of water to consumers are the
Metro Water Board (or government) and the wholesale water vendors (or the market).
Thus, for simplicity, we can analyse this as though there were just two producers whose
interaction is shown by a reaction function (following Cullis and Jones 1992: 399). This
is shown in Figure 4.
Quadrant I relates to market provision of water. Quadrant IV indicates the government
provision. The assumptions here are: good G (water per capita per day) is a rival good
and both public and private sectors can produce this at a constant marginal cost of MCw
If there were no public provision, the market outcome would have produced a quantity
where the marginal cost equals the private demand Dp, that is, quantity equal to Om
0.I f
the government considers it to be a merit good it could produce Og
1 =O m
0. However,
19 The calculation is explained as follows. Numbers are quantities in MLD from water balance sheet.
Description is given in brackets. For public sector 193 = 97 (unmetered residential supply from Metro
Water board) + 4 (public fountains) + 10 (from static tanks) + 50 (from India Mark-2 pumps) + 32
(from municipal supply in rest of MMA). For private sources 131.1 = 10 (from private wells) + 79
(private tubewells) + 15 (private wells in rest of MUA) + 22 (tubewells in rest of MUA) + 1 (other
sources) + 4 (supply by tankers) + 0.1 (bottled water).
20 This is given by 433 (from Metro Water) + 32 (from municipal sources in CUA).
21 Apart from Gujarat, Tamil Nadu is the only state in India to have a ground water regulation law that
gives licensing powers to the water utility. Supporters of this regulation argue that because of it, the
fall in water table in some coastal villages in the outskirts of Chennai has been arrested
(Ramakrishnan, n.d.). However, as I argue below, this regulation may also have favoured bigger firms
among water tanker operators and thus, make the market structure oligopolistic.16
Figure 4
Ground water regulation and private sector response in Chennai















Quandrant III Quandrant II
R (1) – reaction function with a slope of 45 degrees, suggested by Cullis and Jones.
R (2) – a plausible reaction function in Chennai.
let us assume22 that the government only produces Og
0. To trace the impact of this on
market provision, a reaction function is shown in quadrant III. According to Cullis and
22 There are four reasons why the government does not produce the entire quantity. (a) Given that
individual households have inalienable right to ground water through their property right to land, the
government feels that it cannot realistically claim the entire quantity. (b) Property rights, in terms of
government owned well-fields, limit public water supplies at Og
0. (c) The government does want to
produce the entire quantity but by the time the projects are implemented, population growth takes
place, effectively creating a shortfall. (d) Government’s limited resources are needed for supplying
pure public goods which will not be supplied by the private sector. As water supply is not a public
good, there is scope for market provision. The government takes this into account and hence, decides
to produce Og
0 which is < Og
1. Another possible reason which can only be hypothesised is that the
government is interested in keeping the problem alive to use it as a tool periodically at the time of
elections. This may also be linked to the argument that the system has created a transitional gains
trap: ‘once a rent has been successfully sought out through government lobbying, it is very difficult to17
Jones, the slope of this reaction function depends on two factors (explained below). In
the simplest case, this reaction function has a slope of –1 (water produced by
government and the market are substitutable).
If the government provides Og
0, the impact on market can be traced by reading the
reaction function and the market provision now decreases from Om
0 to Om
1.T o t a l
provision of the good is such that Om
0 =O g
0 +O m
1. Following Cullis and Jones, total
provision of the water (Gt =O m
0) is the sum of water provided by the government (Gg)
and water provided by the market (Pm):
Gt =G g +P m
Pm =O m
0 -aG g +b(G g -T g)( 2 )
Cullis and Jones point out that ‘a’ here measures the extent of closeness of substitution
between the market and government produced goods; Gg is the value of water provided
by the government and Tg is the financial impact (water charges) of the provision of the
good by government. Coefficient ‘b’ represents the marginal propensity to consume
good G out of income. Slope of the reaction function:
dP m
------- = -a + b (3)
dG g
The reaction function R(1) is one where a=1 and b=0. For a case like water supply,
product differentiation is limited and hence ‘a’ can be assumed to be 1; however,
because of other likely benefits from having a water connection or perceived superiority
of quality of water supplied by the Metro Water Board, people of Chennai may have
a>1. Therefore, it is conceivable that the reaction function in Chennai for water has a
slope of more than –1 (i.e., a steeper R(2)). The implication of steeper R(2) can be
explained as follows:
i) If the government does not provide this service, the market will need to
provide Om￿. However, market equilibrium is Om
0. Hence, if it is entirely left
to the market, shortage (equal to Om￿ –O m
0) will result.
ii) Planners assume that water supplied by public sector and private sector are
perfectly substitutable (hence, slope of reaction function = -1). Using R(1),
planners calculate the total quantity to be Og
1 =O m
0. Government decides to
provide Og




0). Hence, they issue licenses limiting the total quantity from
market to Om
1.
remove even after it has ceased to produce positive profits for its rent seeking beneficiairies’ (Tullock
1993: 68).18
iii) However, in consumers’ view, water supplied by public sector and private
sector are not perfectly substitutable. They use a steeper R(2). Given Og
0, they
require Om
2 from the market.
iv) As the regulation limits the market to supply Om
1 a water shortage occurs.
v) This may result in ‘grey’ market for water in the short run and/or a political
pressure from consumers to increase government supply from Og
0 to Og
2.
vi) Grey market activities may result in over-extraction of water in nearby sources
pushing the marginal cost of extraction to MC2.
i) This will result in a new equilibrium quantity (not shown in the figure, but let
us say is Om￿) which is lower than Om
0. Since government is already
supplying Og
0, market will supply a quantity that is even lower than Om
1
(equal to Om￿ minus Og
0). The amount of shortage increases thereby further
increasing grey market activity and political pressure to increase government
supply.
This seems to be a plausible summary of what has been happening in Chennai with
regard to ground water regulation. It is a rather simple model based on assumptions
about rational behaviour by both planners and by private agents/water traders.23
Notwithstanding the limitations of these assumptions, there are some issues concerning
regulation. The stringent licensing requirements to transport water (through tanker
trucks) or to sell water have the effect of restricting market response to Om
1 assuming
the reaction function to be Og
0. The above discussion suggests that the regulation
should not be limited to controlling the number of tanker trucks but should be made
more flexible to facilitate markets to function and at the same time have provisions
stringent enough to ensure that aquifers are not irreversibly damaged (through over
extraction) or that water trade endangers water supply provision in the metropolis. For
simplicity, one may refer to such regulation as framework regulation.
As mentioned earlier, there is also scope for introducing some kind of ‘tradeable water
rights’ (equivalent to result in a supply of Om
1). These aquifer rights can be valid for a
specified period of time and these can be auctioned to reflect the market price. A
provision could be created such that some of the rents accrue (or are earmarked) to the
local communities where the aquifers are located. At present, any such rent is
appropriated by those who own the tubewells and by the water tanker operators.
Covenants can be written into the agreements such that limitations can be placed on
these rights (with due process and transparency, to avoid arbitrariness).
23 In the case of water supply planner, the assumptions are that such a planner (a) behaves rationally and
(b) makes decisions in public interest. Either of these assumptions may not work: the planner may be
making incorrect (or uninformed) decisions or s/he may not be making decisions purely in public
interest. Besides standard textbook arguments such as empire-building (by expanding the
bureaucracy), rent-seeking etc., the planner may also be partisan and colludes with political party in
power. In the case of water traders, violation of rational behaviour assumptions can take place in
several ways: (a) having an inertia to react to market demand (which may not be entirely irrational, if
it is due to high fixed costs and seasonal variability in demand); (b) not having full information about
the sources; (c) not recognizing various risks and taking adequate cover and so on.19
3.6 A suggested framework to develop the water balance sheet into a computable
general equilibrium model
I recognize that the discussion so far has been a static analysis. An alternative approach
is to use a partial or general equilibrium framework (Devarajan, 1997; Gunning and
Keyzer, 1995; Goldin and Roland-Holst, 1995; Ringler 2001). This lies beyond the
scope of this work but the water balance sheet developed in this paper can contribute to
the development of a general equilibrium model for water markets in a metropolitan city
with multiple sources and uses of water. In Figure 5, I have shown one possible way to
approach water balance for a city using CGE.
Figure 5
A possible way to approach water balance for a city using CGE
WsSurface sources WgGround water sources
Total Water Available
W=W s+W g
Water drawn by Water supplied by Water supplied by
individuals by state market
Swi ws +O g 0 Om1




Aggregate (city wide) supply W = Swi +( w s +O g 0 )+ Om1
Aggregate water (city wide) demand = Wd<W
Demand in m categories
Household demand Demand in other
wh categories of users
whp from whm Public From
wi public from sector market
sector market supply20
The above framework indicates the need for concentrating both on supply and demand
sides of water supply management in a city such as Chennai. It indicates of the potential
link between the water supplied by Metro Water Board, and the other sources that
households already have (wi) and what they will buy from the market. Household
decisions can have an impact on water prices for other submarkets (such as hotels,
business, construction and so on). These demand factors together with regulation
determine how much water will be supplied by private sector (Om1). Of course, we need
to be careful not to fall into the trap of an overly deterministic or mechanical emphasis
on equilibrium. The aggregate supply and demand sides may not match because of
natural constraints (such as monsoon failure), imperfect information, interaction
between the different sub-markets, the role of a rent-seeking state in projecting itself as
the monopoly supplier of some aspects of water supply and also using its regulatory
powers to affect the roles of other agents and so on. Secondly, even if the aggregate
supply and demand do match, a city-wide analysis may not sufficiently reflect the
inequality in access discussed earlier.
4 Exploring inequality in access to water
4.1 Distribution equity
As discussed earlier, a national, regional or city-wide statistic will not reveal inequality
in distribution. The share of water available to different income groups cannot be
worked out without detailed consumption surveys. From the limited data available, I
have worked out the average quantities of water delivered by different sources
(Figure 6).
For instance, from the water balance sheet we know that unmetered residential
consumers get about 97 MLD. According to the Census 1991, we know that the number
of households having a water connection within their premises is 205, 765, and the
average household size is 5. Therefore, per capita consumption comes to 94 lpcd.
Another example can be of those using public fountains. According to Metro Water,
there were 7, 879 public fountains. From the Census, we know that 129, 360 households
were getting water from a ‘tap outside their premises’ and if we assume that this entire
groups of households get water from a public fountain that works out to roughly 16
households or 80 persons per stand post (assuming all stand posts are functioning). The
stand posts get water from the same mains that are supplying to residential consumers.
If we use the same statistic of 880 litres per connection (total quantity of water supplied
divided by the total number of connections including public fountains), that works out
to 11 lpcd.
As shown in Table 3 earlier, we know from the 1996 survey the various sources of
water supply used by each household. That information can now be combined with the
above estimate of quantity of water per capita from each source. For example, a
household in row 1 in Table 3 (no source within the premises) has no command over
water supply at all. On the other hand, a household having a well and a connection (row
6 in Table 3), can on average get about 94 lpcd from the connection and another 16 lpcd
from the well: a total of 110 lpcd. A household having a well, a tubewell and a




























































































































































Figure 6: Quantity of water from different sources in lpcd
Quantity in lpcd
4.2 Estimating water endowment
As discussed in section 2, I have attempted to use entitlements approach to calculate the
water endowment of a household based on their access to various sources. Table 5
below summarizes the endowments for households in different income groups.
Table 5
Households in Chennai as per income and water endowment
Households as per monthly income group




2,000 3,000 4,500 8,000 20,000
All income
Groups
0 65.0% 52.3% 21.9% 12.1% 31.8%
16 10.0% 13.6% 6.3% 24.2% 15.8% 14.2%
94 15.0% 22.7% 37.5% 33.3% 26.3% 27.7%
110 6.8% 6.3% 6.1% 31.6% 8.8%
125 10.0% 2.3% 6.3% 6.1% 4.7%
















The figures in table 5 indicate that in general, the poor have less endowment of water
(also see Appendix 2 for water endowment ladders for households in different income
groups). For example, 65 per cent of the lowest income group do not have any source of
water in their premises. Another 10 per cent depend of shallow wells that provide only
16 lpcd of water and so on. The arithmetic mean figures for each income group are
reported below in Figure 7. There is an indication of a positive association between
income and water endowment. In terms of location, we can see that households in
Chennai City have nearly twice as much water endowment as those living beyond the
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Average household income Rs.p.m.
Figure 7: Household Water Endowment in litres per capita per day
Endowment from










Chennai City 9 Towns Rest of CMA
Figure 8: Household Water endowment in lpcd as per location
Endowment from Metro
w a t e ro rt a p
Endowment from ground
water23
Further, from Figure 9 it can be seen that salinity or brackishness affects a larger
proportion of low income households: however, the quantity of water that they have
access to is limited and hence, the water endowment is already so low that the impact of
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Figure 9: Change in household water endowment due to salinity
Water endowment
Endowment(salinity)
Using the water endowment, it is possible to see the distribution implications which the
coverage figures do not show at all.24 We see the appalling inequality in access to water
which is completely ignored by the coverage figures and per capita water supply
figures. The water endowment ladders (in Appendix 2) show that the poorest
households in Chennai have to manage with about 30 lpcd of water as compared with
about 150 lpcd that the richest households in Chennai could get. Inequality in access to
water reflects the embedded inequality in opportunity in the urban economy. However,
covering up this inequality with the use of distribution-neutral language of ‘coverage’
f i g u r e si sa tb e s tas c a n d a l .
4.3 Implications of an entitlements approach
An entitlements approach emphasizes the need to see the problem as one of ‘some
people not having enough water’ rather than one of ‘there being not enough water’
(following Sen 1981). The above discussion indicates that an entitlements approach
clarifies inequality in access to water supply and why some interventions (such as
bringing more water to Chennai) may not have significant impact on the poor. While
water balance sheet helps us to understand the allocation of water to different end-users,
entitlements approach helps in understanding one specific group of such end-uses,
namely supply to households. Entitlements approach helps in understanding why within
24 It is possible to construct Lorenz curves to examine the distribution issues. This has been shown in
Anand and Perman (1999: 37). It was seen that the bottom 40 per cent (i.e., poorest) households get
less than 5 per cent of water supplied in Chennai whereas the top 20 per cent (richest) households get
about 55 per cent of water.24
a single city, lush green lawns and long queues and verbal and physical conflicts for
water can co-exist.
The discussion above has clearly shown that water endowment is a much better
indicator for policy purposes rather than per capita water availability or percentage of
population covered. The Metro Water Board has already recognized the need to
distinguish between those who have access to piped water supply and those who do not
have this access (CMWSSB 2000). Unlike the earlier figure of 92 per cent (mentioned
at the beginning of the paper), the above report uses a figure of 70 per cent of
population having access to piped water supply, much closer to my 1996 figure of 58
per cent (Table 3). From the figures in Table 3, we also know that of those who have
access to water, some of them share a connection. Thus, in theory, they have access to
piped water, the water that they do get may depend on micro-level issues of ownership
and control. Another study (Bajpai and Bhandari 2001) based on National Sample
Survey data from 31, 323 urban households also finds that about 70 per cent of all urban
households depend on tap water (as opposed to the figure of 90.2 per cent given by
Government of India). They also find that of those who have access to tap, some 54 per
cent require sharing with other households.
I have already mentioned various reasons why an entitlements approach is relevant to
water. Other researchers (Webb and Iskandarani 1998) have used the expression ‘water
insecurity’ to focus on similar issues. However, I feel that entitlements approach has
advantages in terms of explaining acquirement problem and legal, political and social
institutions governing access. Further, it enables us to understand water scarcity from a
completely different perspective of individual capabilities rather than a problem of
commodity. Inadequate or improperly defined entitlements limit the functionings of the
households and hence their capabilities, and thus, diminish their well-being.
5 Household responses to water quality
In the previous sections, the focus has been mainly on the quantity aspects of water. As
mentioned in section 2 earlier, in interpreting entitlements issues in case of water,
quality has relevance specially in relation to access issues. In many cities in the
developing world, some water borne diseases are endemic.25 Depending on income and
perceived health risks, households often take steps to deal with water quality, specially,
with regard to water for human consumption (drinking and cooking). Table 6 provides
information on steps taken by households in Chennai to improve water quality. About
37.2 per cent of all households drink water without substantially improving its quality.26
25 As per the World Bank (1993), in the case of India, communicable diseases constitute 57 per cent of
all disease burden for women, and 54 per cent for men. For both women and men, nearly a fifth of
disease burden due to communicable diseases is due to diarrheal diseases where water supply could
play a role.
26 Total of first three rows in Table 5. As candle filter is not effective against micro-organisms, health
risks for those who use candle filter and those who do not use candle filter are assumed to be the
same.25
Table 6
Water quality and household responses in Chennai
Mean Monthly Income Rs.
Water quality
response 2,000 3,000 4,500 8,000 20,000
Entire
Sample
Drink as it is 85.0% 34.1% 25.0% 3.0% 5.3% 28.4%
Boil some times 11.4% 12.5% 3.0% 6.8%
Candle filter 9.1% 2.0%
Boil always 15.0% 50.0% 31.3% 30.3% 21.1% 33.1%
Boil and candle filter 28.1% 30.3% 15.8% 16.2%
Ultra-violet filter 3.1% 18.2% 36.8% 9.5%
Bottled water 3.0% 10.5% 2.1%
UV filter and bottled
water
10.5% 2.0%
Entire sample 13.5% 29.7% 21.6% 22.3% 12.8% 100.0%
Improving the quality of water involves some allocation of resources by the household
(capital costs, fuel, time). Hence, as can be expected, response to water quality indicates
a strong association with income: the higher the income, the higher is the expenditure
incurred on improving water quality. Boiling of water takes time and consumes energy.
A candle filter can cost around Rs. 500 i.e., about 2.5 per cent of annual income for
lowest income group. An ultra-violet ray filter costs up to Rs. 6,000 and requires
electricity, an over-head tank and plumbing. The observed association between income
and responses in terms of water quality is also supported from other socio-economic
characteristics as shown below in Table 7.
Table 7
Water quality versus education and crowding
Household response to water quality Years of schooling Persons per room in the
household
Drink as it is 7.0 2.99
Boil some times 8.0 2.51
Use candle filter 10.2 1.06
Boil always 13.0 2.17
Boil and use candle filter 13.2 1.65
Use ultra-violet filter 14.0 0.93
Use bottled water 17.0 1.33
Use UV filter and bottled water 15.7 0.7926
It is interesting to see from the survey data that domestic fuel source (in terms of access
to cooking gas or LPG) has an impact on the boiling of water as a household response to
water quality. This is seen in Table 8.
Table 8
Water quality versus availability of gas connection





Household response No Yes
Drink as it is 76.2% 23.8% 28.4%
Boil some times 50.0% 50.0% 6.8%
Candle filter 100.0% 2.0%
Boil always 34.7% 65.3% 33.1%
Boil and candle filter 4.2% 95.8% 16.2%
Ultra-violet filter 100.0% 9.5%
Bottled water 100.0% 2.1%
UV filter and bottled water 100.0% 2.0%
Of all households 37.2% 62.8% 100.0%
Note: For each row, figures in columns A and B add to 100. Figures in C are column-
percentages.
Having a cooking or LPG gas connection seems to be the most significant parameter for
people to boil water (to reduce the risk of water borne diseases). It is very interesting to
notice that in terms of the five income groups, in the lowest income group (mean
income Rs. 2000) not a single household had access to gas (0 per cent). In the highest
income group, every one had access to gas (100 per cent). The percentage of people in
the income group not having gas connection falls dramatically as one moves up the
income ladder. Thus, the poor households who do not have access to gas, are more
likely to drink water as it is and not boil it or improve its quality in any manner and
hence, are likely to be more vulnerable to health impacts. This highlights the point about
entitlement deprivation due to lack of access to energy.
6 Household expenditure on water
In this section, I want to explore briefly, household expenditure27 on water. Such
expenditure comprises three elements: direct payment (such as water charges, payments
made to vendors or water sellers); expenditure in terms of time spent collecting water
27 These are actual expenditures. In a forthcoming paper, I discuss details of survey based estimates of
willingness to pay and the implications.27
(applicable to households not having a source of water within the premises or those
having a well but not having pumping facility); expenditure to improve the quality of
water. The estimated expenditures28 are shown in Table 9. These figures are averages
for households in each income group.
Table 9
Household expenditures on water























2,000 11.50 24.47 6.30 42.27 2.1%
3,000 16.14 27.19 18.20 61.53 2.0%
4,500 40.94 16.97 27.56 85.47 1.9%
8,000 50.30 5.77 69.03 125.11 1.5%
20,000 60.53 0.00 123.11 183.63 0.9%
Sample mean m 34.19 16.35 43.42 93.95
Standard deviation s 26.97 24.83 64.72 73.53
m/s 1.7704 0.6585 0.6709 1.2777
Though there is some variation in expenditures towards water quality, highest variation
(as seen from m/s) is in terms of direct costs (or costs towards quantity). It is also
evident from the table that for the lower income groups, the value of time lost is the
main cost component. For higher income households, improving water quality is the
main cost item. From the last column in the table, we can see that the poor do spend a
higher proportion of their income on water as compared to the rich.
6.1 The relationship between expenditure on water and income
In the household survey in Chennai, data on income was not collected. However, based
on a number of parameters, each respondent was placed in one of five income groups.
Based on focus group discussions and discussions with researchers in Chennai, the
corresponding class interval of income for each of these 5 income groups are has been
and hence, the mean monthly incomes have been. During the pre-tests, respondents
approved of these mean monthly income figures. Hence, exploration of relationship
between expenditure on water and income (shown in the Curves and Table 10 below)
has some limitations.
28 Details of the estimation are in Anand (2001).28
Curve 1: Total expenditure on water Rs. per month
Monthly income Rs.








Curve 2: Expenditure on water as a % of income
Monthly income Rs.












Expenditure on water and income relationship
Dependent variable Constant Log (Income) R square Number of
observations
Total expenditure on














Note: t-statistics are given in parenthesis.
It is interesting to see that the above curves are fairly similar to the curves obtained in a
study of Jamalpur, Bangladesh, between willingness to pay for water and income,
(reported in ADB 1999: 46). The signs of the constant and the co-efficients in the above
equations are also similar to the figures reported in that study.
6.2 Water endowment and expenditure on water
Another dimension to explore is whether there is a positive association between water
endowment and total monthly expenditure on water. This can be seen from the data
presented in Table 11 according to households in various water endowment levels.
A regression analysis using a quadratic form gives the following result:
Total expenditure = 61.784 + 0. 561 * WATENDOW - 0.0007 * WATENDOW
2
(7.04) (2.57) (-0.77)
t-statistics are given in parentheses. R square: 0.16429
Table 11
Expenditures on water by households as per water endowment





Quantity Time Quality Total
0 9.89 32.55 16.02 58.46
16 18.57 13.65 46.33 78.56
94 45.73 10.24 51.44 107.41
110 50.77 14.07 79.23 144.07
125 40.00 0.00 15.00 55.00
219 70.00 0.00 81.76 151.76
235 100.00 0.00 33.00 133.00
From the equation, it was seen that the elasticity of expenditure to quantity is 0.54 for
first 50 litres; 0.44 for the next 50 litres; 0.35 for the next 100 litres and 0.21 for the next
100 litres.
Some multi-variate regression29 results are reported in Table 12. As mentioned earlier,
the information on income is limited. Hence, here we use proxies for income, namely,
years of education and water endowment (which are positively associated with income),
and household size (which is negatively associated with income).
The results conform to general expectations. If what people are spending is an
indication of demand, in case of a normal good, we will expect it to be positively
associated with income (or its surrogate here, i.e., years of education). Similarly, we
will expect the poor, (namely those who have less education and less water endowment)
to spend more time collecting water. Thus, expenditure in terms of time spent collecting
water should be negatively associated with income. Here, we find that both years of
schooling and water endowment are highly significant and have the minus sign as
expected.
29 To check for collinearity, tolerance statistic was calculated. First, one of the independent variables is
regressed with the remaining independent variables. The tolerance statistic is calculated as (1 minus R
square). If there is absolutely no collinearity, the tolerance factor will approach 1; if there is a high
degree of collinearity, the tolerance factor will approach zero. We find that water endowment has a
tolerance factor of 0.8; all other variables have much higher values of tolerance factors. Though
inclusion of water endowment introduces some degree of collinearity, it contributes to improving the
model specification as seen from the change in adjusted R square. Hence, dropping it could lead to a
mis-specified model. The models are also checked for heteroskedasticity using a White test.
Normalized residuals were saved and these were used as regressors against the dependent variable. In
all the cases reported in the table, the homoskedasticity assumption was not violated.30
Table 12



















































































R square 0.765 0.224 0.272 0.390
N 145 145 145 145
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses.
Household size should have a positive sign in relation to expenditure on quantity;
however, we find it has a negative sign, though it was not significant. While household
size is an indicator of poverty, a larger household may also mean that there are more
people to collect water.
With regard to expenditure on water quality, we will expect it to be positively
associated with income and education: we do find that the coefficient of years of
schooling is positive and highly significant; water endowment is also positive but not
significant. Household size has a negative sign as expected, though it was not
significant.
Households residing within Chennai city, in general, spend more on quantity and
quality, but not on time. Recall from Figure 8 earlier that those living within Chennai
city are better endowed with water than those living in the rest of the metropolitan area.
In general, when the respondent is the owner of the house, they are more likely to spend
on both quantity and quality.
From the above details, we can see that the poorest (who have very little water
endowment per capita) incur significant costs mainly due to time costs. Subsidizing31
water supply will mainly affect the ‘quantity’ costs. However, as seen in Table 9 earlier,
for the poorest households, main expenditure is on time spent collecting water. The
main policy issue, therefore, appears to be how the time taken for collecting water can
be decreased, for instance, by increasing the number of sources available to the poor.
With regard to water quality, giving access to more efficient fuels such as cooking gas
may influence household decision to boil water. This relates to water quality as a link to
health burden and capability deprivation of the poor.
There could be a number of other costs resulting from water scarcity in Chennai, which
I have not considered. I will give two examples. As a result of rationing of water and
supplying it intermittently, households will have to store the fresh water in various
containers or in over-head tanks or ground level sumps. This provides an ideal breeding
site for malaria causing A-Stephensi mosquitoes. The respondents in this survey, when
asked to rate 14 local public services in Chennai on a scale of 1 to 5 (representing very
bad to very good), consistently across all income groups, rated mosquito control as
being very bad or bad (see table 1 in Anand 1999c). Also, 84.6 per cent of respondents
reported that they incur expenditure on mosquito repellents of various kinds. So long as
water supply in Chennai will remain rationed and intermittent, the problem of
mosquitoes will remain. A more important cost is also in terms of malaria incidence and
the productivity loss related to it. A second example relates to the strain of having to
carry water over a considerable distance. I suspect it could have both short term health
impacts such as muscle sprains and spasms and long term health impacts in terms of
persistent back aches (that restrict various functionings) and in some cases, hernia
requiring surgery. These may, thus, require health expenditures not often considered in
relation to water supply and also have an impact on productivity. When no distinction is
made between those who have a source of water within the premises and those who
need to carry it over a significant distance, there could be, thus, a significant
underestimation of costs borne by the citizens.
7 Conclusions
Will Chennai’s water supply position improve and will all households get more water?
The answer depends on whether water supply is seen as a hydrological/hydro-geological
problem of there being not enough quantity around or a political and economic problem
of some people not having enough water and how allocation of water is determined. As
already discussed, the state government’s decision to improve the performance of the
Metro Water Board, may depend on the dynamics of whether the same party is
incumbent at the state as well as local governments, and the prospects of its winning
local elections. There is scope for further research on exploring these issues from an
interest groups and rent seeking perspective. For instance, the budget-constrained
bureaucrats may see water scarcity as an opportunity to increase the budget of the water
utility and to increase their regulatory power. Some interest groups who benefit from
maintaining the traditional institutions such as property rights to ground water or
farmers’ riparian rights to surface sources may resist the regulation encroaching on their
domain. The government may find itself in a transitional gains trap (Tullock 1993: 66)
while it tries to re-allocate water to different users. A situation of water scarcity may
also increase the power of the government in as much as it enables the government to
re-distribute privileges among the various interest groups with less resistance. Scarcity
may also give an opportunity to strike new alliances with other interest groups to32
promote new projects (which may in turn increase the resources at the command of the
government or to apportion blame in case of failure of the projects). At the same time, if
scarcity persists too long, there is a danger of alienating voters. Thus, a government’s
decision to improve the performance of a service such as water supply depends on a
number of factors and one has to be careful in drawing any policy conclusions.
Though water conservation is emphasized from time to time, the overwhelming focus
has been on bringing more water to Chennai. The discussion on water balance sheet and
entitlements indicates that while source development is an important aspect, attention is
also needed on delivering the water to the end users and improving access to water.
Increasing the quantity of supply will have some welfare impact but this is likely to
accrue disproportionately to those who already have water connections than to those
who do not have access to such connections. The research reported in this paper is a
small step to apply the entitlements and capabilities approach to understand inequality
in access to urban water supply.
The water balance sheet concept can be useful to enhance the transparency of a water
utility. Just as water utilities submit annual financial accounts, they could present
information on simple water balance sheets. I have also indicated a possible model to
develop the water balance sheet into a computable general equilibrium model. As
already mentioned, one should be careful not to fall into the trap of the mechanics of the
model and lose sight of the more important institutional and political aspects.
The analysis of ground water regulation and market response discussed in this paper
suggests that imposing quantity restrictions on private sector activity in the form of
licensing may actually exacerbate grey market activity for water pumping. It is likely
that because of the regulation, the quantity of supply from the private sector is lower
than what it should have been; the consumers may have paid higher prices; or both. This
does not mean that the private sector is a doyen of virtue and that the government
should adapt a policy of laissez-faire and delicense water trade. There is a need to
develop a framework or enabling regulation that takes into account the various
incentives for different actors rather than considering ground water extraction in
isolation.
Though I have briefly explored some costs to consumers and their expenditure on water,
I have included here only two hidden (or indirect) costs, namely, those relating to water
quality improvement and the cost of time in collecting water. Health impacts are likely
to be important, and need to be explored further. There is a need to explore how
consumers influence public policy concerning the provision of various services. Though
voting behaviour can give some indication of preferences of citizens, it may be difficult
to isolate what consumers expect in relation to specific aspects of water supply and
sanitation. There may be some relevance in exploring consumer preferences more
directly, through consultation or surveys. Some issues in this regard are explored in a
forthcoming paper.33
Appendix 1
Household survey in Chennai and interviews
The data for this study comes from a household survey undertaken by me as part of my
doctoral research during June to September 1996. Details of the survey design and
diagnostics are provided in Anand (1996) and Anand (2001) The questionnaire covered
a number of issues including household attitudes toward environment and public
services; water consumption and expenditures; willingness to pay issues. The
questionnaire design was based on two focus group discussions in Chennai in June
1996.
The sample households were drawn using a multi-stage cluster sampling method. My
aim was to sample 200 households. The target sample was distributed to the 3 different
parts of the metropolitan area (Chennai City, 9 towns and rest of metropolitan area)
using population-proportionate sampling (PPS) method. Then, in each part, spatial
clusters were identified. For example, in case of Chennai city, the city is divided into 10
Zones by the Corporation of Chennai and I used these 10 zones as clusters. In the next
stage, in each zone, clusters were created using Census wards or divisions. In the next
step, in each selected ward, clusters were created using street networks. The blocks so
created are sometimes known as super-blocks. Then in that block, all the housing units
were numbered and using random sampling, the sample households were identified. In
all, I interviewed 148 households representing different parts of Chennai. These
households represented different socio-economic groups, about 43 per cent of
respondents were women. All age groups were represented. Some summary statistics
from the survey are reported below.
Male; Female % 56.8; 43.2
Average age of respondent, years 43.1
Average years of schooling 10.2
Average household size 5.08
Average number of rooms in house 3.17
Owners % 66.2
Those living in hutments (slums) % 18.9
Having water connection % 48.6
Having a toilet % 87.8
Having electricity % 97.0
Having TV % 93.2
In addition, I had in-depth interviews with officials of the Metro Water Board, the
Corporation of Chennai, researchers at the Central Groundwater Board, Chennai,
Institute of Water Studies, Chennai; three wholesale water tanker operators; a private
company engaged in bottled water production; several water tanker drivers of both
public sector and private sector. I had also used participant observation method to
understand water transactions and benefited from discussions with retail water vendors.34
Appendix 2
Water endowment levels of households in different income groups
The following figures use the data in Table 5. Each curve is constructed as a ladder
showing the cumulative percentage of households in that income groups having
different levels of water endowment. For example, figure (a) relates to households in the
lowest income group. Among these, the first 65 per cent of households have zero water
endowment. The next 10 per cent of households have 16 lpcd; the next 15 per cent have
94 lpcd; and the top 10 per cent have 125 lpcd (see Table 5). On the other hand in figure
(e) (relating to the richest group), there is no one without water endowment. The first 16
per cent households have 16 lpcd; thereafter everyone has 94 lpcd or more.
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Note: Y-axis represents water endowment in litres per capita per day.
Also note: in figure (a), the upper limit is 140 lpcd whereas in all the others it is 250 lpcd.35
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